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EMPLOYMENT LAW-INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTOR EMPLOYED BY A REGULATION?
SEBAGO V BOSTON CAB DISPATCH, INC., 28

N.E.3D 1139 (MASS. 2015).
The definition of an independent contractor is not only one of the
most contended, but also one of the most critical employment law concepts
because of the grave consequences caused by misclassification.' If a
business in Massachusetts misclassifies a worker as an independent
contractor, a slew of other employment laws are also violated carrying both
civil and criminal remedies. In Sebago v. Boston Cab Dispatch,Inc.,' the
Supreme Judicial Court ("SJC") took on a critical issue in which a
regulation named "Hackney Carriage Rules and Flat Rate Handbook"
("Rule 403") conflicted with the statute, Massachusetts General Laws
chapter 149, section 148(B) ("Independent Contractor Statute"). 4 The SIC

1 See Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can't Tell an Employee When it Sees One and
How it Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 300 (2001) (demonstrating
ambiguity caused by Independent Contractor Statute); Robert M. Shea, The Massachusetts
Independent Contractor Law: Serious Problems and Difficult Choices for Businesses in
Massachusetts,
MORSE
BARNES-BROWN
PENDLETON
(Oct.
5,
2005),
http://www.mbbp.com/news /mass-independent-contractor-law (stating serious consequences if
"a company misclassified employees as independent contractors"); see also An Advisory From
the Attorney General's Fair Labor Division on M.G.L. c. 149, s. 148B, MASSACHUSETTS
ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S
OFFICE
1,
1
(2008),
http://www.mass.gov/ago/docs/workplace/independent-contractor-advisory.pdf [hereinafter Mass.
Att y Gen. Advisory] (listing consequences of independent contractor misclassification).
Consequences of misclassification include insurance fraud, depriving individuals of rightful
benefits, as well as depriving the state from revenue taxes. Id.
2 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 148B (LexisNexis 2004) (stating if statute is
violated, victim may be entitled to both criminal and civil remedies); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 149, § 148 (LexisNexis 20082009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151, § 1 (LexisNexis 2014);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 152a (LexisNexis 2004); Julien M. Mundele, Not Everything That
Glitters Is Gold, Misclassification of Employees: The Blurred Line Between Independent
Contractors and Employees Under the Major ClassificationTests, 20 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP.
ADVOC. 253, 269 (2015) (finding violations of employment law).
3 28 N.E.3d 1139 (Mass. 2015).
4 See Sebago, 28 N.E.3d at 1142-43 (stating Independent Contractor Statute legal issue in
case). Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148B, states, in pertinent part:
(a) For the purpose of this chapter and chapter 151, an individual performing any
service, except as authorized under this chapter, shall be considered to be an employee
under those chapters unless: -:
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determined Rule 403 and the Independent Contractor Statute could coexist,
but the Court clarified that when an ordinance conflicts with the
Independent Contractor Statute, Rule 403 will govern.5
In Sebago, the plaintiffs-four taxi drivers-brought a claim for

misclassification under the Independent Contractor Statute against several
defendants. 6 The defendants own a wide range of businesses within the
taxi industry including medallion owners, radio associations, and a taxi

garage owner.7

The defendants argued that the Independent Contractor

(1) the individual is free from control and direction in connection with the
performance of the service, both under his contract for the performance of service
and in fact; and
(2) the service is performed outside the usual course of business of the employer;
and,
(3) the individual is customarily engaged in an independently established trade,
occupation, profession or business of the same nature as that involved in the
service performed.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, §148B(a) (LexisNexis 2004). Moreover, the
Boston Police Department, Hackney Carriage Rules and Flat Rate Handbook
states, in pertinent part:
II. Police Commissioner's Regulation of the Hackney Carriage Industry
a. Pursuant to the authority granted by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and
the City of Boston, the Police Commissioner of the Boston Police Department is
granted the authority to regulate the Hackney Carriage industry within the City of
Boston. See Appendix 1.
b. To this end, the Commissioner has promulgated these regulations and
established an enforcement unit within the Boston Police Department to oversee
the implementation and enforcement of these regulations.
c. This document is intended to be a comprehensive and definitive listing of all
regulations affecting the Hackney Carriage industry in the City of Boston as of
August 29, 2008.
d. From time to time, the Police Commissioner may amend these regulations in
order to promote public wellbeing, convenience, safety, and to respond to the
changing needs of the industry.
403, HACKNEY CARRIAGE RULES AND FLAT RATE HANDBOOK
[hereinafter RULE 403], https://staticl.squarespace.com/static/5086f19ce4b0adI6ffl 5598d/t
/52af61ele4b0871946c07a41/1387225569980/Rule+403.pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 2017).
5 See Sebago, 28 N.E.3d at 1146-56 (separating parts of taxicab industry regulated by Rule
403 from Independent Contractor Statute); see also Ruggiero v. Am. United Life Ins. Co., 137 F.
Supp. 3d 104, 114 (D. Mass. 2015) (stating when there is conflict, Rule 403 will control). The
court stated, "where a relationship as defined by regulation expressly precludes the satisfaction of
a prong of the independent contractor statute, the independent contractor statute will not govern."
Id.
6 See Sebago, 28 N.E.3d at 1143-45 (stating names of plaintiffs and argument against
defendants).
7 See id at 1144 (describing defendants as individuals who "each own corporations," which
"own and lease quantities of taxicabs "); see also RULE 403, supra note 4, at §4(l) (defining job
of medallion owner); RULE 403, supra note 4, at §7(l) (stating regulation and defining
responsibilities of radio associations).
Bos. POLICE DEP'T RULE
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Statute should not apply due to separate state regulation of the taxi industry
under Rule 403." Rule 403 was amended in 2008 in order to regulate the
taxi industry's "ownership, leasing, licensing, rate setting, and operation of
the taxicabs." 9 Due to the restrictions created by Rule 403, the plaintiffs
argued they are employees under the Independent Contractor Statute, while
the defendants argued that Rule 403 specifically allowed them to classify
the plaintiffs as independent contractors. 10
The plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that
the defendants
could not
prove
the plaintiffs were not acting within their
"usul
corseof
"
,11
usual course of business.
The defendants then submitted a cross

8 See Sebago, 28 N.E.3d at 1143 (explaining plaintiffs' argument that theycannot be
independent contractors pursuant to Rule 403); Brief of Appellees at 3, Sebago v. Tutunjian, 2014
Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 623 (Mass. App. Ct. 2014) (No. 13-P-1356) (stating court would be
unduly punishing defendants for following law). The defendants argue they were merely
following Rule 403 regulations and, thus, it would be unfair to find that they had violated the
Independent Contractor Statute. Id.; Brief of Amicus Curiae, City of Boston at 17, Sebago v.
Tutunjian, 2014 7 N.E.3d 1122 (Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 623 (Mass. App. Ct. 2014) (No. 13P-1356) (stating taxicab industry is regulated as a public utility); Sam Frizell, A Historical
Argument Against Uber: Taxi Regulations Are There for a Reason, TiME (Nov. 19, 2014),

http://time.com/3592035/uber-taxi-history/ ("Taxis are pretty much a public utility. Like subway
and bus systems, the electric grid or the sewage system, taxis provide an invaluable service to
cities ... and the government should play an important role in regulating them.").
9 See Sebago, 28 N.E.3d at 1143 (stating Rule 403 requirements). The court states:
Rule 403 sets forth a myriad of requirements that must be met in order to qualify for a
medallion, including being deemed "suitable" individuals by the city's in-spector of
carriages, obtaining adequate garage facilities within the city, and maintaining
membership in an approved "dispatch service or radio association, which provides
twenty-four (24) hour two-way communication solely, and exclusively, for Boston
[taxicabs]."

Id. (citing Rule 403, §4(II)(a), (1), (q)); see also RULE 403, supra note 4, at §1(I) (giving
definitions related to Rule 403 and regulation of Hackney Carriage Industry). "Pursuant to the
authority granted by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the City of Boston, the Police
Commissioner of Boston Police Department is granted the authority to regulate the Hackney
Carriage industry within the City of Boston." RuLE 403, supra note 4, at §1(II)(a). The Police
Commissioner was given the power to create these rules as well as "establish[] an enforcement
unit within the Boston Police Department to oversee the implementation and enforcement of
these regulations." Id. at §1(II)(b).
10 See Sebago, 28 N.E.3d at 1143 (stating arguments given by both plaintiffs and defendant).
The plaintiffs counter by stating "a municipal regulation cannot override the State's independent
contractor statute." Id.
" See id. at 1145 (stating lower court's decision to deny summary judgment); Sebago v.
USA Taxi Ass'n, Inc., No. 125904, 2013 Mass. Super. LEXIS 213, at *6 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec.
23, 2013) (stating plaintiffs' argument that defendants are in same business of providing
transportation to customers); see also MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 148B(a)(2) (LexisNexis

2004) (stating second prong of Independent Contractor Statute test).
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motion for summary judgment against the plaintiffs. 12 However, the
Superior Court denied both motions stating there were "genuine issues of
material fact."' 3
The case was reported to the Appeals Court of
Massachusetts, but was picked up by the SJC who decided whether to grant
the motion for summary judgment. 14
Upon review, the SJC reversed the lower court's decision granting
the motion for summary judgment in favor of the defendants. 5 The Court

answered three central issues concerning the Independent Contractor
Statute. 16

The first issue was whether Rule 403 could supersede the

Independent Contractor Statute. 17 The second issue was whether the taxi
drivers had been providing a service for the defendants. ' 8 Finally, the third
issue was whether the taxi drivers had been misclassified under the

Independent Contractor Statute.19
The classification of a worker as an independent contractor did not
become relevant until late in the American Industrial Revolution. 20 The
classification was created to better define the relationship between the
12

See Sebago, 2013 Mass. Super. LExIs 213, at *6 (stating defendant's argument that

plaintiff's do not provide service).
13 See Sebago, 28 N.E.3d at 1145 (stating superior court position on summary judgment
issue); Sebago, 2013 Mass. Super. LExIs 213, at *6 (holding fact dispute arises from whether
defendants' business would not exist without plaintiffs). The defendants raised two issues during
sumnmary judgment. Id. at *3-6. First is whether Rule 403 exempts the defendants from MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, §148B considerations. Id. at *3. The second issue is whether the
plaintiffs are within the "usual course of business." Id.at *6.
14 See Sebago, 28 N.E.3d at 1156 (vacating superior court summary judgment decision).
15 See id. (stating decision of court).
16 See id. at 1146-56 (answering these three issues within this decision).
17 See id.at 1146 (describing whether Rule 403 supersedes MASS. GEN. LAW ch. 149,

§148B). To determine whether Rule 403 supersedes the Massachusetts statute, the SJC looked at
the underlying purpose of the regulation. Id.; see also American Motorcyclist Ass'n v. Park Com.
of Brockton, 592 N.E.2d 1314, 1316 (Mass. 1992) (quoting Bloom v. Worcester, 293 N.E.2d 268,
279 (Mass. 1973)) ("As a general proposition... local regulations with State statutes have given
considerable latitude to municipalities, requiring a sharp conflict between the local and State
provisions ....
");Kubinec v. Top Cab Dispatch, Inc., No. SUCV2012-03082-BLS1, 2014 Mass.
Super. LEXIS 93, at *32-33 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 24, 2014) (demonstrating Rule 403 cannot
have power or control to override Independent Contractor Statute).
18 Sebago, 28 N.E.3d at 1147-49 (deciding whether relationship between parties equates to
services as defined by Independent Contractor Statute); see also Athol Daily News v. Bd. of
Review of the Div. of Empl. & Training, 786 N.E.2d 365, 370-71 (Mass. 2003) (quoting MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 151A, § 2 (1990)) ("Service performed by an individual ... shall be deemed to be
employment ....).
19 See Sebago, 28 N.E.3d at 1149-56 (using three-part test in Independent Contractor Statute
to determine employment). The court further discusses how Rule 403 and the Independent
Contractor Statute can work together in harmony. See id.at 1143.
20 See Carlson supra note 1, at 301-02 (stating after industrial revolution, employment
classification became more complicated). Before the industrial revolution there were "fewer
types of work, fewer occupations" and "simpler organization[s]." Id.
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worker and the employer in negligence claims. 2 ' Historically, courts have

used the term "master-servant" instead of employer-employee with an
emphasis on the amount of control between the tWO. 2 2 Recently, there has
been an influx in cases involving the distinction between independent
contractors due to an increase in start-ups, as well as the government's
increased concern for misclassification of employees. 23 However, given

that most cases are fact specific, courts have had to create a factors test in
order to accommodate differences that arise in cases. 2 4

Independent contractor law is strictly state based, and therefore,
independent contractor laws vary from state to state .25 However, each
26
state's law is based off of the same underlying theories and policy goals.
21

See id. at 305 (finding earliest cases arose from businesses or employees trying to parse

out blame); Mundele, supra note 2, at 258 (stating classification based on "vicarious liability
through the doctrine of respondeat superior"); see also O'Malley's Case, 281 N.E.2d 277, 278
(Mass. 1972) (considering liability caused by swinging door hitting juror on way to jury room);
McDermott's Case, 186 N.E. 231, 233 (Mass. 1933) (deciding whether company was liable for
injuries received while working).
22 See O'Malley's Case, 281 N.E.2d at 278 (finding court must determine whether worker
was "a servant or employee"); McDermott's Case, 186 N.E. 231, 232 ("The relation of employer
and employee is the same relation that is familiar throughout the law under the name of master
and servant."); De Giovanni v. Jani-King Int'l, Inc., 262 F.R.D. 71, 85 (D. Mass. 2009) (focusing
on control of franchisees over their franchises); Mundele, supra note 2, at 258 (pointing out
historical use of master and servant correlating to employer and employee definitions).
23 See O'Connor v. Uber Techs., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1135 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)
(summarizing case as Uber driver bringing class action against employer Uber Technologies,
Inc.); Nancy Cremins, HEADS UP: The Rise of the On Demand Economy: The Tension Between
Current Employment Laws and Modern Workforce Realities, 60 B.B.J. 27, 27 (2016) (discussing
increase in start-ups caused companies to label workers as independent contractors); see also
Griffin Toronjo Pivateau, Rethinking the Worker Classification Test: Employees,
Entrepreneurship,and Empowerment, 34 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 67, 72 (2013) (providing examples
of federal agencies which have increased interest in lessoning employee misclassification). For
instance, the Department of Labor created the "Misclassification Initiative" in which states have
signed agreements to communicate and "share information... about non-compliant companies."
Id.
24 See Am. Zurich Ins. Co. v.Dep't of Indus. Accidents, No. 05-3469-A, 2006 Mass. Super.
LEXIS 333, at *11 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 1, 2006) (listing number of factors used by courts to
determine employment). To determine employment, courts specifically look to "(1) whether the
worker is paid by the job or by the hour; (2) whether the employer provides tools, equipment, or
materials on the job; and (3) whether the relationship can be terminated without any liability on
the part of the employer." Id.; Mass. Att y Gen. Advisory, supra note 1, at 2 (providing list of six
common-law factors courts should consider); see also Carlson, supra note 1, at 299 (pointing out
how courts have been creating an "ever-expanding catalogue of 'factors"').
25 See Shea, supra note 1 (pointing out that states have different Independent Contractor
Statutes); Mundele, supra note 2, at 264 (demonstrating fact that "no two state Independent
Contractor Statutes are alike ....
").
26 See Carlson, supra note 1, at 300 (stating three approaches courts take in determining
employment status). The article explains the common-law test, which includes: (1) the control
test, (2) the economic realities approach which analyzes the nature of the employee's work and
the employer's business, and (3) the statutory purpose approach, which focuses on the intent of

430

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XXII

The most prominent of these concepts is the desire to protect employees
from harm caused by businesses trying to circumvent the law.27 Each state
may take direction from factors derived from the Internal Revenue Service
("IRS") which are mostly intended to help identify employment for tax
purposes, but can also be helpful for employment classification purposes.28
Differing state law and varying factors can possible cause confusion for
businesses looking to expand to different states.29
Massachusetts has taken a more comprehensive approach to the
Independent Contractor Statute by accepting a three-pronged approach,
which covers all industries.3 0 The statute carries with it both civil and
criminal punishments as well as the violation of several other laws.3 '
Further, Massachusetts has amended the statute and has taken a more

unique

route

by

separating

its

statute

from

the

unemployment

compensation statute, thereby placing independent contractor clarification
under its own employment statute. 32 The Massachusetts legislature
recognizes the complexity and potential confusion the Independent

Contractor Statute can cause and has signed, along with thirty-five other
states,

the

United

States

Department

of Labor's

Misclassification

the Independent Contractor Statute. Id; see also Mundele, supra note 2, at 273-78 (demonstrating
three tests used by courts). The "control" test is concerned with the amount of power the
employer has over the employee, whereas the "economic reality" test examines the difference
between the employee's and the employer's business. Id. Finally, the "relative nature of the
work" test looks at the relationship between the two parties. Id. The employee is an independent
contractor if the employer's business could not provide service without the worker. Id.at 276.
27 See Depianti v. Jan-Pro Franchising Int'l, Inc., 990 N.E.2d 1054, 1066 (Mass. 2013)
(stating purpose of Independent Contractor Statute is to protect individual workers). The statute
is "'intended to address misdeeds suffered by individuals', rather than to punish public wrongs."
Id.
28 See Carlson, supra note 1, at 335 (listing 20 factors used by Internal Revenue Service to
determine employment statute).
29 See Carlson, supra note 1, at 299 (finding numerous factors and unpredictability of
outcomes causes uncertainty); Mundele, supra note 2, at 255 (finding misclassification is due to
employers not understanding state law).
30 See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 148B(d) (LexisNexis 2004) (stating three-part test to
determine employment); see also Mundele, supra note 2, at 269 (stating that "Massachusetts
independent contractor statute may be the most comprehensive statute").
31 See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 148B(d) (LexisNexis 2004) (stating violators "shall be
punished and ... subject to all of the criminal and civil remedies ....); Mundele, supra note 2,
at 269 (finding violation of Independent Contractor Statute means violation of number of other
statutes); Mass. Att'y Gen. Advisory, supra note 1, at 4-5 (listing statutes violated).
32 See Shea, supra note 1 (analyzing Massachusetts Independent Contractor law).
For
instance, the second prong of the Independent Contractor Statute, stating that a worker is not an
employee if they perform services "outside the usual course of business of the employer,"
removed the phrase "or is performed outside of all places of business of the enterprise." Id;
compare MASS. GEN LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 148B (West, Westlaw through 1998 Mass. Acts. ch.
236, § 12), and Athol Daily News v. Bd. of Review of the Div. of Empl. & Training, 786 N.E.2d
365, 371-72 (Mass. 2003) (analyzing same), with MASS. GEN LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 148B.
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Initiative.33 Despite efforts to simplify, more issues have arisen with
applying the Independent Contractor Statute, such as it contravening with
other laws currently in place .' Recently, a division in arguments has
emerged, with one side arguing certain contradicting laws should preclude
the Independent Contractor Statute.35 While others believe companies
cannot use the current laws as an excuse to circumvent the policy rational
of the Independent Contractor Statute; thus, the statute should 36only be
struck down when the express meaning contradicts another statute.
In Sebago v. Boston Cab Dispatch Inc., the SIC determined that
classifying the plaintiffs as independent contractors did not violate the
Independent Contractor Statute.37 In their analysis, prior to applying the
Independent Contractor Statute, the court explained Rule 403 could
harmoniously exist with the Independent Contractor Statute .38 The SIC
33 See Misclassification of Employees as Independent Contractors, U.S. DEP'T
OF LAB.,
WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION,

https://www.dol.gov/whd/workers/misclassification/

(last visited

Nov. 16, 2016) (listing states who signed Misclassification Initiative).
34 See Monell v. Boston Pads, LLC., 31 N.E.3d 60, 67-68 (Mass. 2015) (stating conflict
between Independent Contractor Statute and current real estate licensing statute); Sebago v.
Boston Cab Dispatch Inc., 28 N.E.3d 1139, 1142 (Mass. 2015) (addressing conflict between
wording of Independent Contractor Statute and Rule 403); Ruggiero v. Am. United Life Ins. Co.,
137 F. Supp. 3d 104, 114-16 (D. Mass 2015) (recognizing possible conflict between terms
regarding Independent Contractor Statute and federal securities laws).
35 See Sebago, 28 N.E.3d at 1146 (explaining that "the taxicab industry" was "separately
regulated by the city as a public utility"); Brief of Appellees USA Taxi Ass'n, Inc. and George
Summers at 3, Sebago v. Tutunjian, 7 N.E.3d 1122 (Mass. App. Ct. 2014) (No. SJC-11757)
(stating defendants' argument that conduct was legal due to its adherence to regulation); see also
Robert C. Block, Conflicting State and Local Laws, 38 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 40, 41
(1947) (explaining historical tension in contradicting state or local statutes).
36 See Sebago, 28 N.E.3d at 1146 (stating Independent Contractor Statute "must be applied in
a manner consistent with its underlying purpose"); Boston Gas Co. v. City of Somerville, 652
N.E.2d 132, 133 (Mass. 1995) (stating when inconsistency exists, court should look to express
legislative intent for guidance); American Motorcyclist Ass'n v. Park Com. of Brockton, 592
N.E.2d 1314, 1316 (Mass. 1992) (stating must be "a sharp conflict between.., local and State
provisions" for striking down ordinance); Brief for Appellants at 45, Sebago v. Tutunjian, 2014
Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 623 (Mass. App. Ct. 2014) (No. 13-P-1356) (allowing regulation to
preempt statute provides businesses to shield themselves from state laws); Robert C. Block,
Conflicting State and Local Laws, 38 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 40, 41 (1947) (stating
conflicting interpretation which believes only striking down statute "where the difference is
irreconcilable").
37 See Sebago, 28 N.E.3d at 1142-43 (stating court's determination under Independent
Contractor Statute).
38 See id. at 1143 (interpreting Rule 403 and Independent Contractor Statute could to not
contravene each other). The SJC recognized that in contrast to the Workers Compensation law,
which specifically states that taxi drivers are not included, the Independent Contractor Statute
makes no specification. Id. at 1146-47. Thus, the legislative intent must have been to broadly
leave employment options open. Id. at 1155. Furthermore, the Court held that the Independent
Contractor Statute's purpose did not conflict with Rule 403. Id. at 1146; see also MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 152, § 1(4) (LexisNexis 2011) ("The following words as used in this chapter
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stated that the plaintiffs were performing a service for the defendants by
broadening the meaning of "service" to anything outside the category of
"the mere operation of their lessor-lessee relationship." 3 9 Once the SIC
answered these preliminary questions, the court then applied the
Independent Contractor Statute by utilizing tests created by precedent in
Massachusetts and Illinois courts, as combined with suggestions by the
Attorney General. 40
Applying these tests, the SIC determined the
defendants had satisfied the required elements for each prong of the

Independent Contractor Statute. 41

shall... have the following meanings: ... (4) "Employee", every person in the service of
another under any contract for hire... excepting... (e) a person who operates a taxicab vehicle
which is leased by such person from a taxicab company pursuant to an independent
contract ... "); Boston Gas Co., 652 N.E.2d at 133 (stating "[m]unicipalities may not adopt [sic]
ordinances that are inconsistent with State laws"). This case contains some of the same
considerations the SJC in Sebago did such as "express legislative intent" and whether the
"Legislature intended to preempt the field." Id. at 133; American MotorcyclistAss 'n, 592 N.E.2d

at 1317 ("Local regulations with state statutes have given considerable latitude to municipalities,
requiring a sharp conflict between the local and State provisions."). But see Monell, 31 N.E.3d at
63 (finding "a conflict between the independent contractor and real estate licensing statutes").
39 See Sebago, 28 N.E.3d at 1148-49 (stating test which should be applied to situation where
lessor-lessee relationship exists). The SJC recognized that the test normally used is simply
whether the worker performs a service for the employer. Id. at 1147. Given the regulation created
by Rule 403, the SJC has created a test which looks at the plaintiffs' and defendants' relationship
outside the scope of Rule 403. Id. at 1148-49; MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 148B(a) (LexisNexis
2004) (stating "an individual" must be "performing any service" to be considered under this
statute); see also Depianti v. Jan-Pro Franchising Int'l, Inc., 990 N.E.2d 1054, 1065-66 (Mass.
2013) (holding first question when arguing misclassification is whether worker performs services
for employer).
40 See Sebago, 28 N.E.3d at 1149-53 (determining tests to be used for Independent
Contractor Statute). The court used a test, suggested by the attorney general, which states that to
determine whether there is control, the court must look at "whether the worker's activities and
duties [were] actually... carried out with minimal instruction." Id. at 1149 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Under the second prong, the court determined that the test should be "whether
the service the individual is performing is necessary to the business of the employing unit or
merely incidental," and how the business defines its work. Id. at 1150 (citations omitted). The
SJC found that the test for the third prong should be "whether the worker is capable of
performing the service to anyone wishing to avail themselves of the service or, conversely,
whether the nature of the business compels the worker to depend on a single employer .... Id. at
1153; Athol Daily News v. Bd. of Review of the Div. of Empl. & Training, 786 N.E.2d 365, 36769 (Mass. 2003) (illustrating how newspaper defined its business as publishing newspapers
instead of delivering them).
41 See Sebago, 28 N.E.3d at 1149-53 (applying factors for three-pronged independent
contractor test). The SJC reasoned for the first prong that there was minimal control because the
taxi driver is free to pick up whomever they want and to choose to operate on their own. Id. at
1150; Comm'r of the Div. of Unemployment Assistance v. Town Taxi of Cape Cod, 862 N.E.2d
430, 434-35 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) (finding taxi drivers were free to determine work schedule
and use cabs for personal use). The SJC held the plaintiffs were separately defined businesses
because the defendants held themselves out as only leasing medallions to the plaintiffs and any

business apart from the lease is only incidental. Sebago, 28 N.E.3d at 1151. Finally, in applying
the third prong the SJC determined that the taxi drivers were free to use the taxis however they
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The SIC in Sebago took the more restrictive position regarding the
circumstances in which a worker should be classified as an independent
contractor, while trying to harmonize the interplay between the
Independent Contractor Statute and Rule 403.42 The express language can
be demonstrated in the tests created or words used by the court. 43 Further,
the SIC also recognized that much of their decision rested considerably on

the fact that Rule 403 cannot override the Independent Contractor Statute.44
However, the court also noted that the legislature seemed to support the

lease model for the taxi industry as well as the freedom given within Rule
403 to determine employment options. 45 Finally, there was no clear
evidence of an "end run" given the taxicab industry was participating in a
business framework created by Rule 403.46

The Independent Contractor Statute has been criticized as being
complex and confusing in nature by both businesses and lawyers due to the
many factors involved in determining the employment status of the

want, work with whomever they want, and even work for several different dispatchers. Id. at
1153.
42 See Sebago, 28 N.E.3d at 1146-55 (demonstrating limiting language and restrictions
placed in tests due to existence of Rule 403). For instance, the court restricted the test to
determine whether the plaintiff was performing a service for the defendants to apply only to those
services performed outside of Rule 403. Id. at 1148.
41 See id. at 1147-49 (demonstrating limiting language in tests). For example, service
requirement is limited to anything outside the lessor-lessee relationship. Id. at 1147. In prong
two, the court limited the employee relationship to the high standard of what was "necessary" for
the course of the business. Id. at 1149.
44 See id. at 1147-53 (demonstrating tests which have been limited by Rule 403). For
instance, the court changed the test in defining a service by limiting it to anything outside the
lessor-lesser relationship created in Rule 403. Id. at 1148. Under prong two, the usual course of
business was determined outside the restrictions set by Rule 403. Id. Furthermore, Rule 403
requires the taxi driver to look in a particular way, treat passengers a certain way, and control fare
prices. Id. at 1150-51. In fact, the court states that "businesses operating under the regime of Rule
403 may be described aptly as members of a highly regulated industry." Id. at 1144.
45 See id. at 1154 ("We also observe that if drivers operating in the shifted model were
employees, then the shift fees (or lease payments) on which that model rests would clearly violate
public policy as payments required for the right to work. Such a result would be patently
inconsistent with the Legislature's indorsement of the lease model, which is implicit in the
exemption of taxicab lessees from the definition of 'employee' in the workers' compensation
law."). Furthermore, the SJC states "[t]he more harmonious reading of the statutory framework is
that the Legislature intended to preserve the ability of taxicab drivers to operate as either
employees or independent contractors." Id. at 1155.
46 Id. at 1147-49 (finding no proof of end run because defendants participated in system
created by Rule 403). Plaintiffs argued the defendants comprise one large corporation. See id. at
146-47. The SJC, however, rejected this argument, stating that "[t]he mere fact of common
management and shareholders among related corporate entities has repeatedly been held not to
establish, as a matter of law, a partnership, agency or 'joint venture' relationship ....
Id. at 1147
(quoting Gurry v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 550 N.E.2d 127, 133 (Mass. 1990)).
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worker.
In Sebago, the SIC clarified a path for determining when a
regulation, which has a large impact on the worker and employer, is

deemed to override the Independent Contractor Statute

48

Furthermore, the

SIC clarified some of the tests used by lower courts to determine the
employment of the worker. 49 The court's clarification of the Massachusetts
Independent Contractor Statute given in Sebago has both increased the
burden of proof on the defendants and further provided necessary clarity

for future courts analysis.5 o
By determining that Rule 403 and the Independent Contractor

Statute do not conflict with each other, the SIC has increased future
defendants'

burden of proving when another statute contradicts the

Independent Contractor Statute. 5'

The defendants' argument that the

Independent Contractor Statute did not apply failed due to the SJC's stating
the Independent Contractor Statute and Rule 403 can coexist.5 2 In holding
for the plaintiffs, the SIC stated that in order for an ordinance to conflict

with the statute regarding independent contractors, it must "frustrate the
purpose of the statute" as opposed to merely regulating the industry.53
See Mundele, supra note 2, at 269 (stating that "Massachusetts independent contractor
statute may be the most comprehensive statute"); see also Carlson, supra note 1, at 335 (finding
that numerous factors and unpredictability of Independent Contractor Statute causes uncertainty).
48 See Sebago, 28 N.E.3d at 1146 (finding tests changed because Rule 403 did not override
Independent Contractor Statute). For instance, the test to determine whether the worker
performed a service for the employer changed to omit the contractual relationship created by Rule
403. Id. at 1148.
49 See id. at 1149-51 (analyzing tests used to determine employment status).
50 See Rosenthal v. Romano Grp., No. 15-P-799, 2016 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 701, at *6
(Mass. App. Ct. July 14, 2016) (using tests provided by Sebago to determine type of employment
for plaintiff); Ruggiero v. Am. United Life Ins. Co., 137 F. Supp. 3d 104, 120-23 (D. Mass. 2015)
(using precedent tests to determine plaintiff's employment).
51 See Sebago, 28 N.E.3d at 1155 (holding legislative intent included keeping employment
options open for both employer and worker). But see Monell v. Boston Pads, LLC., 31 N.E.3d
60, 69 (Mass. 2015) (holding court could not determine employment because statute conflicted
with Independent Contractor Statute). In Monell, the court recognized that the usual analysis
used when two statutes conflict is to attempt to read the statutes as harmonious with legislative
intent. Monell, 31 N.E.3d at 69. Id. However, the wording of the applicable statute analyzed in
Monell makes it impossible to apply the Independent Contractor Statute. Id. at 67-68; see also
Cremins, supra note 23, at 27-28 (demonstrating benefits and arguments for being independent
contractor or employee).
52 See Sebago, 28 N.E.3d at 1146 (determining police commissioner was not given broad
power to override Independent Contractor Statute); see also Kubinec v. Top Cab Dispatch, Inc.,
No. 127374, SUCV2012-03082-BLS1, 2014 Mass. Super. LEXIS 93, at *30-33 (Mass Super. Ct.
June 24, 2014) (demonstrating rule does not have power to override another existing statute);
Brief of Amicus Curiae, City of Boston at 10-17, Sebago v. Tutunjian, 2014 Mass. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 623 (Mass. App. Ct. 2014) (No. 13-P-1356) (stating Rule 403 and Independent Contractor
Statute do not contradict, but coexist harmoniously).
53 See Sebago, 28 N.E.3d at 1146 (explaining that statute "must be applied in a manner that is
consistent with its underlying purpose" to protect workers.). The court suggests that both the
47

2017]

]EMPLOYED BY REGULATION?

Therefore, the SIC held against the plaintiffs argument because the
defendants had only been complying with Rule 403 regulations.5 4 After the
decision in Sebago, defendants will have to argue, whenever there is a
possible conflict between a law and regulation, that the regulation frustrates

the purpose of the statute and the interference is substantial.55
The SJC's decisions relies heavily on the Attorney General's
suggestions for applying the Independent Contractor Statute. 56 The
Attorney General, in turn, relies heavily on precedent and also helps to
clarify which part of the test remains vague. 57 Utilizing the Attorney
General's test for prong one, the SIC demonstrated a shift from focusing on
the contract between the two parties' to an emphasis on employers'
instructions to the employee. 58 The Sebago decision demonstrates how to

purpose of the Independent Contractor Statute and the correlating legislative intent have the same
goal. Id. Also, the SJC recognized that the taxicab industry is highly regulated, yet still did not
feel that the regulation conflicted with the Independent Contractor Statute. Id. at 1153; Boston
Gas Co. v. City of Somerville, 652 N.E.2d 132, 133 (Mass. 1995) (finding regulation frustrates
purpose of statute when it interferes with Legislature's intent).
54 See Sebago, 28 N.E.3d at 1155-57 (finding defendants simply participated within
regulatory framework created by Rule 403). The defendants are not attempting to trick the
plaintiffs by having separate businesses such as: the medallion owners, the radio associations, and
the taxi garages because those separate industries were all created by Rule 403. Id.
55 See Ruggiero v. Am. United Life Ins. Co., 137 F. Supp. 3d 104, 115 (D. Mass 2015). The
court acknowledged that:
[T]he parties in this case have not meaningfully focused on the regulatory framework
governing their relationship and have not argued that the regulatory scheme precludes
the application of the independent contractor statute overall. Accordingly, I must
conduct the analysis here on the assumption that the regulatory scheme governing the
particular relationship at issue and the Massachusetts independent contractor statute are
capable of coexistence.
Id; Monell, 31 N.E.3d at 70 (finding failure to include argument regarding "nature of
relationship" prevented court analysis); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae, City of Boston at 10-17,
Sebago v. Tutunjian, 2014 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 623 (Mass. App. Ct. 2014) (No. 13-P1356) (quoting Tillsonv. Springfield, 154 N.E. 561, 562 (Mass. 1927) (stating two statutes must
be "consistent and harmonious body of law").
56 See Sebago, 28 N.E.3d at 1149 (noting SJC's analysis providing "substantial deference" to
Attorney General's interpretation of Independent Contractor Statute).
57 See Mass. Att'y Gen. Advisory, supra note 1, at 1 (using prior state cases to substantiate
tests). Attorney General suggests that because prong two has not been analyzed by prior state
cases, the court should look to Illinois precedent. Id. at 5.
58 See Sebago, 28 N.E.3d at 1149 (stating first prong should be not based on contract
between parties). Rather, this first prong should focus on "whether the worker's activities and
duties [were] actually ... carried out with minimal instruction." Id. (citations omitted); see also
De Giovanni v. Jani-King Int'l., 262 F.R.D. 71, 85 (D. Mass. 2009) (stating court must look at
elements other than contract). But see Machado v. System4 LLC, 28 N.E.3d 401,411-42 (Mass.
2015) (acknowledging significant factor for determining control between parties "is the contract"
and its wording); Kubinec v. Top Cab Dispatch, Inc., No. SUCV2012-03082-BLS1, 2014 Mass.
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apply prongs two and three and clarifies the rules to be used.5 9 In doing so,
the SIC explains how future cases should be decided and argued.60
In Sebago v. Boston Cab Dispatch, Inc., the court determined
whether Rule 403 and the Independent Contractor Statute are harmonious,
and if so, how to correctly apply the Independent Contractor Statute. In
determining that no element of Rule 403 contradicts the Independent
Contractor Statute, but the court held that Rule 403 specifically provides
choice to be considered as an employee or independent contractor. The
court increased the burden on both the plaintiffs and the defendants. PostSebago the plaintiffs, when dealing with a highly regulated industry, must
ignore all aspects of their industry regulated by statute. The defendants,
when arguing a regulation does conflict with an existing law, instead must

emphasize the Independent Contractor Statute's purpose is completely
frustrated by the regulation.
The court has helped to clarify some
confusion surrounding the Independent Contractor Statute by successfully
defining the test to be used by both parties.
Marlee R. Stever

Super. LEXIS 93, at *31 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 24, 2014) (stating first prong's test focuses on
parties and other circumstances).
59 See Sebago, 28 N.E.3d at 1150-53 (stating tests to be used for second and third prongs).
Tests for the second prong focus on the employer's own definition of business and the necessity
of the worker's service that will be considered. See id. at 1150. When assessing the third prong
the court will focus on whether the worker can choose to work for whomever they want, and if
the nature of business would naturally lead to employee's relying on a single employer. See id. at
1153.
60 See id. at 1150 (providing guidance on usual-course-of-business prong of independent
contractor test); accordRuggiero v. Am. United Life Ins. Co., 137 F. Supp. 3d 104, 118-22 (D.
Mass. 2015) (granting defendants' motion for summary judgment based, in part, on Sebago);
Rosenthal v. Romano Grp., No. 15-P-799, 2016 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 701, at *6 (Mass.
App. Ct. July 14, 2016) (affirming summary judgment for defendant where plaintiff properly
classified as independent contractor).

